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Spending to Save? 
State Health Expenditure and Infant Mortality in India 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation and Context 
Inequalities in life expectancy across and within countries are created mainly 
by variation in childhood mortality. In poor countries, 30% of deaths are amongst 
children, compared with less than 1% in rich countries (Cutler et al. 2005, p.15). As 
many as 10 million children  under the age of five  die each y ear, mainly from 
preventable (or curable) conditions that seldom kill children in rich countries (Jones et 
al. 2003, Black et al. 2003). Yet most of the relevant interventions, such as  
immunization or oral rehydration therapy, are very low-cost (e.g. Deaton 2006b). This 
suggests that it is not just a question of raising incomes, but of the effective delivery 
of publicly provided health services. In this paper the effectiveness of public 
intervention (state health expenditure) is measured in terms of its impact on infant 
mortality, or death in the first year of life. 
The analysis is conducted for India, which accounts for one in four of under-5 
deaths, one in three of the poor and one in six of the population in the world. On 
account of its size, it has the highest child death toll in the world: 2.4 million under-
five deaths (Black et al. 2003), and infant deaths account for more than two-thirds of 
these. Infant mortality is regarded as a sensitive indicator of the availability, 
utilisation and effectiveness of healthcare, and it is commonly used for monitoring 
and designing population and health programmes (The Tribune, 2002).  Like the 
United States, India has a federal political structure, and health is a “state subject”, 
which means that the level and allocation of health expenditure are decided at the 
state level.  
Analyses of the historical decline in childhood mortality rates in today’s 
industrialised countries suggest that important drivers of this decline were improved 
nutrition, public health, and medical technological progress (see Fogel 2004, Cutler 
and Miller 2005, Cutler et al. 2006). Improved nutrition tends to be associated with 
growth in income.  Medical progress may, in principle, diffuse across geographic 
boundaries with no tight connection to incomes or public expenditure. Improvements 
in education, water and sanitation, immunization and targeted programmes against   3 
diseases like malaria and diarrhoea  tend to be associated with growth in  public 
spending.  
In assessing the role that  public spending might play in bringing down 
childhood death in poor countries, it is important to disentangle its effects from those 
of other trended variables, in particular, income growth and scientific progress. This is 
done here by investigating  the impact on infant mortality  of  fluctuations  in health 
expenditure around a state-specific trend. Although the conventional wisdom is that 
fiscal policy should  be counter-cyclical, smoothing the effects of income shocks 
(Lane 2003), in practice it is often pro-cyclical in developing countries (Woo 2005). 
At the same time, aggregate income volatility is much greater in poor than in rich 
countries (Pritchett 2000, Koren and Tenreyro 2007). In these circumstances, we may 
expect that mortality is counter-cyclical, with  adverse shocks to household income 
being reinforced by cuts in social expenditure. For the Indian sample analysed here, 
this is the case (Bhalotra 2007). This paper isolates the impact on mortality of changes 
in state health expenditure, holding constant state  income. The effect I identify is 
therefore the effect of changes in the share of state income that is dedicated to health. 
This may vary, for example, in response to health shocks (natural disasters, rainfall 
variation, epidemics), inequality (Woo 2005), the political climate in the state, and the 
salience of public health. 
I use individual data on mortality derived from retrospective fertility histories 
recorded in a national sample survey and merged by birth-cohort with a twenty-nine 
year panel of data on state health expenditure, income and other variables. The 
individual data are, in this way, “nested” in a state-year panel. The main contributions 
of this paper over the existing literature lie in its exploiting sub-national panel data on 
health expenditure to identify its impact, and its use of individual data on mortality to 
investigate heterogeneity in this impact by social group. Let me elaborate each. Most 
previous studies use a single section of cross-country data (see section 1.2). They are 
therefore unable to control for unobservable trends in medical technology which have 
been important in driving mortality reduction, and omission of which will tend to bias 
the estimated effects of health expenditure.
1 Cross-country regressions are also prone 
to other forms of correlated heterogeneity which, in a panel, are absorbed by state 
fixed effects. A further advantage of using a panel and, especially, a long panel, is that 
                                                 
1 Deaton and Paxson (2004), for example, emphasise the importance of controlling for time-
varying unobservables in identifying the impact of income on mortality.   4 
dynamics can be explored. No previous research in this domain appears to have 
explored dynamics and, here, I show that this is critical. This is also the first study in 
this area that controls for correlated weather shocks, omission of which will generate 
spurious co-variation of mortality and health expenditure. Only a couple of previous 
studies have examined heterogeneity in the impact of health expenditure on health 
outcomes and, this, by (simulated) income  groups (Gupta et al 2003, Bidani and 
Ravallion 1997). This study  investigates heterogeneity by observed individual and 
family characteristics. This is interesting in itself but it also provides insight into the 
mechanisms by which health expenditure has an impact, if any.  
Using specifications similar to those in the existing literature, I find the result 
highlighted in the literature, which is that state health spending saves no lives (see 
Filmer and Pritchett 1999). However, restricting the sample to rural households (more 
than two-thirds of all) and conditioning upon state-specific trends, a significant effect 
emerges that is driven by the third lag of health expenditure. The long run marginal 
effect is -0.023 and, with average mortality in the sample at about 9.5%, the elasticity 
is -0.24. A one standard deviation (0.48) increase in log health expenditure per capita 
at a given level of state income is estimated to reduce the risk of mortality by 1% 
which, taking a UN estimate of live births in India in 1990 of 26.3 million,  amounts 
to saving 0.26 million lives. 
There are striking differences in the impact of health expenditure by social 
group. The impact is greater for rural and scheduled tribe households than for urban 
or higher-caste households.  This is consistent with more remotely located people 
benefiting from marginal increases in health expenditure. However, slicing the data 
by gender, birth-order, religion, mother’s and father’s education and maternal age at 
birth, I find weaker effects in the more vulnerable groups. I argue that this may be 
related to the way in which health expenditure is used. Previous studies that have 
looked at the distribution of health expenditure effects have focused on income. The 
effects I find  suggest that attitudes and information, which may not be strongly 
correlated with income, mediate the effects of state spending.  
 
1.2. Related Literature 
When Peru’s GDP fell in 1987-90 by 30%, government health expenditure fell 
by 58%, its budget-share falling from 4.3 to 3%. At the same time, infant mortality 
spiked, rising by 2.5 percentage points (Paxson and Schady 2005). While this is one   5 
of the most persuasive analyses in the literature, describing  trends broken by a big 
exogenous shock, it is difficult to generalise from. In particular, changes in health 
expenditure might impact mortality only when they are very large. There is limited 
evidence on the health effects of  year to year  fluctuations in state health spending 
since most previous studies have used a single section of cross-country data. 
In an influential study, Filmer and Pritchett (1999) investigate the effect of 
government health expenditure on infant and under-5 mortality using cross-sectional 
data on 98 developing countries in 1992/3. They  find a very small and statistically 
insignificant effect.  They  show  that  95% of the variation in mortality  between 
countries is explained by  income per capita, income inequality, female education, 
ethnic fractionalisation, and whether the country is more than 90% Muslim. This is an 
important study with striking results. But the results are not incontrovertible. Using 
data for 50 developing and transition countries observed in 1994, Gupta et. al. (2002) 
find some evidence that government health expenditure is negatively correlated with 
childhood mortality, but they show that this relationship is not robust. Using cross-
sectional data for 22 developing countries in 1985, Anand and Ravallion (1993) find 
that health expenditure raises life expectancy and that, conditional upon this, income 
has no effect. All of these studies suffer two important limitations, which the authors 
recognise.  First, data on both mortality and  government health expenditure are 
unlikely to be comparable across countries. Second, the estimates in these studies are 
subject to bias on account of unobserved heterogeneity that might be correlated with 
the variable of interest (see Durlauf et al. 2005). The present study addresses the first 
problem by using sub-national data, and the second problem by using panel data on 
state health expenditure and income.  
There is some relevant recent work for India (Deolalikar 2005). Using a state 
panel for 1980-99, this study finds no effect of current health expenditure on mortality 
rates once state fixed effects and a linear time trend are included in the model. I find a 
similar result (see below). Anil Deolalikar further investigates the relationship for a 
reduced sample of four years and fourteen states (N=56) for which information on 
female literacy is available.  For  this sample, an interaction term between health 
expenditure and state income is included and the results suggest a negative effect of 
health expenditure but only in the poor states. In a complementary analysis of micro-
data for the period 1994-1998,  he finds the opposite- that the effects of health 
expenditure are weaker in the poor states. My state-specific estimates show no very   6 
clear relation between the effects of health expenditure and the per capita income of 
the state. However, there are differences between  the two studies in sample period, 
data and estimator. In particular, this study uses a longer time period and a more 
flexible specification of trends, it conditions upon rainfall shocks, and it investigates 
lagged effects. It also investigates heterogeneity in the impact of health expenditure. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
Section 3 presents  relevant descriptive statistics. An empirical model is set out in 
Section 4 and results are discussed  together with a range of robustness checks in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Data 
The micro-data are derived from the second round of the National Family 
Health Survey of India (NFHS-2)
2. This contains complete fertility histories for ever-
married women aged 15-49 in 1998-99, including the time and incidence of child 
deaths. I use these to construct individual-level indicators of infant  mortality.  The 
children in the sample are born in 1961-1999. I drop births in the 1960s since these 
data are thin and skewed (see below).  To ensure that every child is allowed full 
exposure to the risk of infant mortality, births that occur in the 12 months preceding 
the survey are excluded. The estimation sample contains more than 150000 children 
of more than 59000 mothers born in 1970-1998 across the 15 major Indian states. 
These micro-data are merged by state and year of birth with a panel of data on health 
expenditure and other relevant statistics for the 15 Indian states.
3  
State health expenditure includes expenditure from state revenue (85%) and 
central government health allocations to the state (15%), the latter often being tied to 
public health and family welfare programmes. I use actual as opposed to budgeted 
                                                 
2 For details on sampling strategy and context, see IIPS and ORC Macro (2000). The data are 
available at www.measuredhs.com. 
3 I am grateful to Tim Besley and Robin Burgess for letting me use their state-level panel  (see 
Besley and Burgess 2002, 2004, for example). Detailed definitions of the state-level variables 
used in these analyses can be found at http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/eopp/research/indian.asp and in 
the Appendices of the papers cited there. The health expenditure series were kindly given to 
me by Juan Pedro Schmid, who gathered them from Reserve Bank of India publications. Juan 
made the series consistent before and after 1985, the year in which the published 
categorisation of health expenditure was changed. Before 1985, state health expenditure 
included expenditure on medical and public health,  family planning and water supply and 
sanitation. From 1985 onwards, family planning and water-sanitation expenditures appear 
separately in the accounts and need to be added in.    7 
revenue expenditure,  even if this makes it more likely that h ealth expenditure is 
endogenous. State health spending covers rural and urban public health services; 
medical education, training and research; general administration; water supply and 
sanitation; and family welfare. The expenditure series is cast in per capita termsand 
deflated by the consumer price index for agricultural workers. State income is 
measured as net domestic product and is subject to the same deflators. The NFHS 
provides a rich set of individual-level controls, which are included in the model to 
control for heterogeneity in death risk. There are no data on household incomes over 
the 28-year period analysed. Permanent income at the household level is proxied by 
parental education, and also caste and religion. Note that the educational attainment of 
parents varies by cohort of child and, in this way, it varies over time. The estimates 
control for aggregate income at the state level, which finances state health expenditure.  
A strength of the mortality data is that they are annual and cover a long period. 
This is unusual (see Pritchett and Summers 1996). However, they have their 
weaknesses.  The rest of this section discusses the way in which these potential 
problems are addressed. As the microdata are constructed from retrospective fertility 
histories, they  are wedge-shaped, there being fewer observations for children born 
earlier in time. Moreover, the thinning of the data does not occur randomly, but is a 
function of maternal age at birth. I therefore condition upon maternal age at birth. 
Another issue that arises with retrospective data is that the mother may have migrated 
between states between the birth of the index child and the date  of interview. 
However the survey asks the mother how long she has lived in her current location. 
Using this information, the analysis is restricted to the 85.1% of births that occurred in 
the mother’s current location, so that we can be confident that infant mortality risk is 
related to h ealth expenditure in the state in which the child was born. As a (rough) 
check on whether this sample selection is endogenous, I compared estimates on the 
restricted and unrestricted samples, and found that they were not significantly 
different. The conventional definition of infant death is death before the first birthday 
of the child. Since mother’s reports of age at death of their children exhibit  age-
heaping at six-monthly intervals, infancy is defined here to include the twelfth month. 
The results are not sensitive to this difference, but the inclusive definition is retained 
since this increases the ratio of ones to zeroes in the dependent variable.  
   8 
3. Descriptive Statistics 
To obtain descriptives, I aggregated the individual data to the state level using 
sampling weights. The aggregation is done by birth cohort, yielding a straightforward 
panel in which state mortality rates can be related to state health expenditure. Figures 
1-4 show the dispersion in levels and trends across the states in mortality, state health 
expenditure, the share of health expenditure in state income, and income. The rate of 
increase in the level and share of state health expenditure has slowed since about the 
mid-1980s, even as the growth rate of state income has increased. Regressing state 
health expenditure on state income, a lagged dependent variable (instrumented with 
two further lags), year and state dummies and state-specific trends, I find a long run 
income elasticity of health spending of -0.41. This is identified f rom within-state 
variation. An elasticity smaller than one indicates that the share of health expenditure 
in income is decreasing in income.
4 . Government health expenditure in India was, on 
average, 1.3% of GDP in 1990, and this had declined to 0.9% in 1999 (NRHM 2005). 
India devotes a smaller share of its income to health spending than, for example, 
Bangladesh (1.4%) or Sri Lanka (1.8%) (Deolalikar 2005: chapter 2; these are figures 
for the year 2000), and it spends a disproportionate part of its health budget on 
(curative) hospital services which are less pro-poor than (preventive) public health 
expenditures (Peters et al. 2002).  
Figure  5  shows that the raw  relationship between mortality and health 
expenditure is negative in most states. Figure 6 plots these data after removing state-
specific trends. In the de-trended data, it is unclear that increases in health expenditure 
are associated with decreases in mortality. The rest of this paper explores whether 
these simple associations persist after conditioning upon other covariates, and 
allowing for lagged effects.
5 
  
4. The Empirical Model 
The baseline model is  
 
                                                 
4 I find a similar elasticity for state education expenditure; results available on request 
5 Growth rates of the main variables by state (Table A1) and summary statistics for  all 
variables in the model (Table A2) are in an Online Appendix available at 
www.efm.bris.ac.uk/www/ecsrb/bhalotra.htm. Figures A1 and A2 in this Appendix describe 
inequality in the levels of mortality and health expenditure across the states.   9 
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Subscripts s and t indicate state and year and i and m indicate the individual child and 
mother respectively, ln denotes logarithm.  M
* is a latent variable measuring the 
probability of infant death, H is per capita real health expenditure, Y is per capita real 
net domestic product and b is the parameter of interest. X is a vector of variables 
observed at the child or mother level, Z is a vector of state-level controls and R
f and 
R
d are vectors of positive and negative state-specific rainfall shocks  (superscripts f 
and d denote “flood” and “drought” respectively). To avoid clutter, I do not show 
dynamics or interaction (and quadratic) terms, though these are investigated, and 
discussed in the Results section. as and at are state and year fixed effects and mst are 
state-specific trends. 
The model is estimated as a probit. All reported standard errors are robust and 
clustered by state. These adjustments allow for conditional heteroskedasticity and for 
conditional autocorrelation within states (see Bertrand et al 2004, Cameron and 
Trivedi 2005, p.788). Note that adjusting for clustering at the state-level takes care of 
any lower-level clustering such as at the community or mother-level. Identification of 
b relies upon there being independent fluctuations in health expenditure within states. 
The relatively long time dimension of the data makes it more likely that this is the 
case. 
X includes dummies for gender and birth-month of the child, age of mother at 
birth of the child, levels of education of each of mother and father, and ethnicity and 
religion of the household. These characteristics have been shown to be significant 
predictors of mortality risk in a number of previous studies, and also in India (e.g. 
Bhalotra and van Soest 2007). Z includes income inequality measured as the log of 
the Gini coefficient for each of the rural and urban sectors, poverty measured as the 
log of the sector-specific headcount ratio, the ratio of the log of agricultural to non-
agricultural income in the state, inflation in consumer prices  and  a quadratic in 
newspaper circulation per capita. 
Rainfall shocks are measured as the absolute deviation of rainfall in each state-
year from its 30-year state-mean. A positive shock is defined as equal to this deviation 
when  it is positive, and zero otherwise. A negative shock is symmetrically defined. 
These are the terms that appear in the regressions.To allow the effects of rainshocks   10 
on mortality to be different in different states, each of these two indicators is 
interacted with 15 state dummies, so that R is a vector of 30 variables. The richness of 
this specification is justified by the results. When rainshocks are restricted to have the 
same effect in every state, they are insignificant. Once state-specific coefficients are 
allowed, they are jointly significant at 1%. The results also show that it is restrictive 
to force positive and negative deviations to have the same effect.
6  
The panel aspect of these data offers some clear advantages. It is important 
that we are able to control for time-varying unobservables including medical 
technological progress. Failing to do so would result in over-estimation of the effects 
of any included trended variables (health expenditure, income). The assumption that 
time dummies capture technology trends is more plausible for states within a country 
than it is in a cross-country panel.
7 This assumption is further relaxed by including 
state-specific trends in the model. The time dummies also capture common (all-India) 
shocks such as famines, floods or epidemics, and the state-specific trends capture not 
only state-specific components of health technology but also other omitted trends, for 
example, in fertility, or public services. The state effects, as, control for all forms of 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity specific to a state. In this context, this is 
likely to include sluggish political institutions, ethnic composition, geography, and 
initial conditions, including the initial level of mortality in the state. They will also 
pick up any persistent differences across the states in accounting conventions 
(measurement error).  
Since health expenditure, the regressor of  interest, varies by state-year, we 
cannot, of course, include state-year dummies to control comprehensively for state-
specific health shocks. As a result, health expenditure remains potentially endogenous. 
Consider, for example, that a particular state suffers a flood or a drought. Suppose that, 
                                                 
6 A natural alternative to using absolute deviations is to use the z -score of rainfall which 
normalises deviations with respect to the standard deviation in the state. The specification 
used here allows a big deviation in rainfall to impact infant mortality as much in a state that 
often experiences rainfall fluctuations as it would in a state with a more stable weather pattern. 
This seems to me the more relevant specification, but I have confirmed that using z-scores 
does not alter the main results of this analysis. 
7 Temple (1999), for example, shows that countries have different rates of technical progress 
in growth regressions, casting doubt that technology is a public good. This said, diffusion of 
health technology across countries may occur more  rapidly than diffusion of production 
technology.   11 
as a result, more infants die, and the state reacts by raising health expenditure.
8 This 
will create a positive association of infant mortality and health expenditure in the data. 
To purge the data of this, I control in a flexible way for rainshocks. These are 
probably the most important sorts of health (and income) shocks given that  most 
infant deaths  are  rural  and  rural households  are more likely to be engaged in 
agriculture, and more likely to live in areas with poor sanitation where rainfall 
variation can directly affect disease epidemiology.  I nevertheless also control for 
other state-level variables, omission of which may drive a spurious correlation 
between health expenditure and mortality. For instance, Woo (2005) argues that fiscal 
policy may be influenced by inequality; so inequality is one of the variables in the 
vector Z in equation (1). I also estimate a model in which current health expenditure is 
replaced by  its first four lags. This makes it even less likely that the expenditure 
coefficient is biased by state-specific shocks that are not controlled for. Section 5.1 
discusses substantive reasons to include lags. 
Since the key regressor (state health expenditure) varies at the state and not the 
individual level, the data  are a bit scarce for  estimation of  state-specific models. 
However, to gain at least an indicative sense of the state-specific relationships, I also 










 Ximt + f
’
 Zt + uimt 
The notation is the same as in equation (1).  
 
5. Results 
Henceforth health expenditure refers to the logarithm of real per capita state health 
expenditure and income refers to the logarithm of real per capita net domestic product 
of the state.  
 5.1. Static Models 
Table 1 presents marginal effects  estimated from  a  probit f or infant mortality 
(equation 1) using a (log)linear term in current health expenditure, a quadratic, and a 
first lag. The results for urban households show that health expenditure has no effect 
on infant mortality, whatever the specification and that income is also insignificant 
                                                 
8 To investigate this directly, I estimated an auxiliary panel data model in which state health 
expenditure is the dependent variable. Controlling for state income, fixed effects and state-
specific trends, I find that rainshocks are jointly significant at the 1% level.   12 
once year dummies are included in the model (Table 1B). Infant mortality rates are 
higher in  rural households and they are, on average, poorer and tend to have lower 
private expenditure on health and nutrition. We may therefore expect that state health 
expenditure is more effective for the rural sample. These results are in Table 1A. 
Although the unconditional correlation of mortality and health expenditure is now 
significant (-0.015), there is no effect once time effects are included. This result is 
unchanged if current expenditure is replaced by its first lag, but the second panel of 
Table 1A shows some evidence of (poorly-determined) non-linearity. It is interesting 
to see that m ortality risk is hump-shaped in health expenditure, the relation turning 
negative at high levels of expenditure, with a marginal effect at the mean of -0.020. A 
possible explanation of this shape is that, at low levels of expenditure, most of it goes 
to politically prioritised areas such as curative care in urban areas, with bigger budgets 
extending to lower-priority areas such as preventive care, water supply or sanitation 
that are more likely to impact mortality at the margin (see Lanjouw and Ravallion 
1999).  I also investigated a specification in which health expenditure was interacted 
with income ( as i n Deolalikar 2005). The interaction term was negative but 
insignificant; these results are not displayed. 
Marginal effects of income are also reported in Table 1. In the absence of 
controls for omitted trends, income has a significant marginal effect of -0.05 on rural 
mortality risk. Although this effect vanishes upon including time dummies (as did the 
health expenditure effect), it re-establishes itself  (ME of  -0.04)  upon inclusion of 
state-specific trends (which health expenditure did not).
9 Dropping income raises the 
marginal effect of health expenditure but does not alter its significance level.  
Rainshocks and micro-demographic variables are jointly significant, but 
dropping them from the model does not alter the health expenditure elasticity. Some 
of the state-level controls are significant but, again, conditioning upon them does not 
make a significant difference to the health expenditure effect. Each of the sets of state 
dummies, year dummies and state-specific trends is jointly significant at the 1% level 
in every specification in which they appear. As we have seen, the results are sensitive 
                                                 
9 This result is consistent with state-specific trends capturing omitted variables that are 
positively correlated  with mortality and health expenditure, but negatively correlated with 
income, for example, fertility. Alternatively, they might reflect trends in technology or in the 
delivery of public services. These might be negatively correlated with mortality and health 
expenditure and positively correlated with income, producing a similar configuration of 
results.   13 
to c onditioning upon time dummies and state-specific trends.  The  results are not 
sensitive to the choice of estimator. The  linear probability model  yields a similar 
pattern of results. Adjusting the standard errors for clustering by state increases them 
by about 43% (see Table  A4 in the online appendix- refer footnote 5).  The main 
conclusion of this section is that health expenditure has no effect on infant mortality 
once common time-varying unobservables are removed.  Although the further 
specifications discussed below were estimated for both samples, there is no case in 
which health expenditure is significant for urban households. From here on, all 
reported results are therefore for the rural sample.  
 
State-Specific Estimates of the Static Model 
It is possible that these negative results conceal some significant state-specific 
slopes. To investigate this, I estimated state-specific models using the time series 
(equation 2). Results are in Table A3 in the online appendix. Health expenditure has a 
significant negative effect in three of the fifteen states (Assam, Maharashtra, West 
Bengal). If I drop state-specific trends, health expenditure is significantly negative in 
five states: Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. 
These five states do not form a natural group in terms of being, for example, poorer, 
or more politically liberal. In contrast, the states that show a negative effect of income 
are the poorer, higher mortality states.  
 
Distributed Lag Model 
Although controlling for fixed effects and rainfall shocks removes  some 
important sources of correlated unobserved heterogeneity, it remains possible that 
there are other state-specific health shocks that raise (or lower) both infant mortality 
and health expenditure, as a result of which the estimated coefficient on health 
expenditure will tend to carry a positive bias.  This  bias  may be  dominating an 
underlying  negative  causal  effect in the  results we have seen so far.  I  therefore 
investigated a distributed lag model that allows four lags of health expenditure. Using 
lags breaks any contemporaneous correlation between mortality and expenditure that 
is driven by an omitted variable, and it allows for the possibility that causal effects 
take time to play out. It is natural to allow the same lags for income. 
The main effects are in Table 2; covariate effects are in Table A5 in the online 
appendix. Every column includes micro-demographics, rainfall shocks, state and time   14 
dummies and state-specific trends. Results are displayed with and without controlling 
for state-level variables. In the absence of state-trends, the inclusion of state-level 
covariates raises the coefficients on health expenditure and income, but it makes little 
difference once state-trends are included. The  main finding is that the third lag of 
health expenditure and the third and fourth lags of income are significant. As this 
specification is asking rather a lot of the data, Table 3 reports estimates of a more 
parsimonious model that retains only the significant terms from the fourth-order lag 
specification. Now  the marginal effect of health expenditure is -0.023 and the long 
run elasticity is -0.21. The long run income elasticity, at -0.28, is bigger. The effects 
of both health expenditure and income are sensitive to exclusion of the state-specific 
trends (see Table 3). 
Replacing current with lagged values does not make a dramatic difference to 
the long run income effect, but it makes an important difference to the health 
expenditure effect (compare  Tables  1A and  3).  Health expenditure appears 
insignificant in most standard specifications, consistent with much of the existing 
literature. However, a sufficiently flexible model reveals a highly significant effect 
driven by the third lag of expenditure. What might explain this? Most infant death 
occurs in the first month and even the first week of life, and it is well known that the 
proximate cause of this is  low birth-weight which,  in  turn,  is  largely explained by 
poor  maternal health. So one lag may simply denote the importance of health 
expenditure in the year before birth (e.g. antenatal care). Since the first lag is not 
significant, it seems that there are further dynamics in the process. An example of a 
mechanism that may generate longer lags is state dependence in mortality within 
families. If a drop in state expenditure three years ago killed a sibling of the index 
child then this, in turn, may have a causal effect on the death risk of the index child 
(see Arulampalam and Bhalotra 2007). Alternatively, it may take longer than a year 
for increases in health spending to reach the ground.  
To summarise the results so far, it is only when we restrict the sample to rural 
households, allow lags, and condition upon state-specific trends that a significant 
impact of health expenditure emerges. A possible explanation is that health 
expenditure is endogenous, and that this endogeneity is being limited by factoring out 
state-specific trends, a nd by lagging health expenditure. As for the rural-urban 
difference, it is well-known that failing to allow for heterogeneity can obscure 
important relationships in sub-populations. The estimated effects are likely to be   15 
conservative both because the survey only records births of mothers who survive until 
the survey date and because it records only live births. Both forms of selection may be 




We have already investigated robustness t o functional form, lags,  state-
specific trends, rainfall shocks, state-level variables and micro-demographics. The rest 
of this section reports the results of further specification checks. First, I explored 
estimating the model on panel data by within groups (see Table 4). For this, the 
individual mortality information (0/1)  was aggregated to the state level by cohort 
using sampling weights. An advantage of this is that it will average out unobserved 
heterogeneity.  The  health expenditure  effect is a bit larger, but insignificantly 
different from that obtained in the analogous model run with micro-data on mortality. 
This suggests that the micro-demographic covariates in the model capture individual 
heterogeneity sufficiently well. Panel regressions in which the dependent variable is 
the log of infant mortality produce broadly similar results. I use the level rather than 
the log because it is more directly comparable with the baseline model estimated on 
individual data.
11 In the panel data specification, I allowed two lagged dependent 
variables to capture persistence in mortality, but these were insignificant.  To 
investigate the hypothesis that significance of the third lag of health expenditure is in 
itself not meaningful but is proxying current  health  expenditure, I  used  the IV-
Systems estimator, instrumenting current health expenditure by its second and third 
lag.
12 The marginal effect is -0.015 but it is insignificant, consistent with the results in 
Table 1.  
Since the only significant results are for the rural sample, I replaced total state 
income with  alternative measures of average income that are specific to the rural 
                                                 
10 UN statistics on mortality rates are also calculated with reference to live births. 
11  If  the individual-level mortality  equation displayed in section 4 is cast as a linear 
probability model, aggregation to the state level will produce a specification in which the 
level (not log) of mortality is the dependent variable. Deaton (2006) argues that the interesting 
question is whether or not income growth causes the level of mortality to decline. He shows 
that evidence of such a relationship in cross-country data is much weaker than evidence of a 
relationship of income growth with proportional changes in mortality. If the same arguments 
apply when income is replaced with health expenditure (or share of), the specification 
estimated in this paper is the more conservative one.  
12 A GMM estimator (e.g. Arellano and Bond 1991) is not appropriate for the long and narrow 
panel here. It is more commonly used when N is large and T is small.   16 
sector.  The marginal effect of health expenditure is  now  larger, and remains 
significant. Relative to the benchmark model where the long run  marginal effect of 
state income is -0.020, it is -0.025 if I use agricultural income, -0.029 if I use mean 
consumption and -0.030 if I use the rural wage. We have already conditioned upon a 
range of state-level variables (listed in  section  4). Although I  have also  already 
conditioned upon the education level of parents, I further investigated conditioning 
upon state education expenditure. This is relevant to the extent that it is correlated 
with both infant mortality and state health expenditure. The coefficient on education 
expenditure is negative but insignificant, and the marginal effect of health expenditure 
is not altered.  
 
5.3. Heterogeneity by Social Group 
Having found significant heterogeneity by sector (rural/urban) in the health 
expenditure effect, heterogeneity by social class (micro-demographics) was further 
investigated for the sample of rural households.  This is interesting in itself and 
provides insight into the underlying mechanisms. It is unusual in the literature relating 
social expenditures and outcomes, which is dominated by cross-country data analysis 
(section 1). The specification estimated is that in column 3 of Table 3 and results are 
in Table 5. Every slicing of the data produces a significant difference in the health 
expenditure effect.  A general  –and surprising-  pattern that emerges is that  health 
expenditure is less effective in reducing infant mortality in more vulnerable sections 
of society, that is,  groups with relatively high mortality rates.
13 For example, the 
marginal effect is larger for boys, high caste children, Muslim children,  higher-order 
births, children of educated mothers, and children born when the mother is in the 
relatively safe age range of 19-30 years. These differences are, of course, even larger 
when we look at the elasticity at the mean rather than at the marginal effect and, in 
most cases, health expenditure effects in the counterpart groups (girls, low caste etc) 
are insignificant (see Table 5).  
The complete absence of any health expenditure effect for women  with no 
education is striking because maternal education creates especially large differences 
                                                 
13 Mortality rates and the sample contribution of each group are in Table 5. The reported 
percentages of children in each group will differ from, for example, census proportions of 
these social groups to the extent that there is differential fertility across groups. Also note that 
these are figures for rural India.   17 
in mortality risk: average infant mortality of children of uneducated mothers is 10.4%, 
falling to 6.9% for mothers with some (non-zero) education, and to 3.5% for mothers 
with secondary or higher education. Educated mothers are likely to be better informed 
and so to extract a greater marginal advantage from a given level of health 
expenditure (see Jalan and Ravallion 2003). Similarly, prime-aged mothers might be 
more aware than teenage mothers, and Muslim mothers might exercise higher 
standards of sanitation within the home if regular prayer is associated with the 
requirement of regular washing. So it seems that heterogeneity in the health 
expenditure effect relates to how households use public resources and not necessarily 
to the distribution of these resources. This is supported by the results obtained by 
gender and birth-order. It is unlikely that there are systematic differences in the policy 
environment faced by, say, boys and girls. It is more likely that households allocate 
resources differently across children. In the case of gender, the results are consistent 
with the widely documented fact of son-preference in India. In particular, Basu (1989) 
shows that, conditional upon being sick, boys are more likely to be taken to a 
treatment-centre than are girls.  In the case of birth-order, the results can be 
rationalised in terms of learning. If the first-born dies of diarrhea, the mother is more 
likely to learn about Oral Rehydration Therapy and use it to avert death for 
subsequent children.  
There are two deviations from the pattern described so far, that is, two cases in 
which the more vulnerable group is more responsive to health expenditure. This, of 
course, is  what we would expect on account of diminishing returns, and because 
better-off groups can afford to protect themselves against infant mortality even when 
state health services are weak. One case, that we have already encountered, is that 
health expenditure is more effective in rural than in urban areas. Mortality risk is 3.6 
percentage-points  higher for rural as compared to urban children.  Even if health 
services are more sparse and variable in rural areas, there is greater scope for bringing 
down mortality. The other deviation is evident only when the low-caste group is sub-
divided into its three components, which are scheduled castes (SC), scheduled tribes 
(ST) and “other backward classes” (OBC). State health expenditure has only  small 
and insignificant effects on the SC and OBC groups, but it has a large negative effect 
on children of scheduled tribes (ST). Indeed, this is the largest marginal effect of any 
sub-group, about four times as large as the average effect in rural areas. The ST group 
are about 12% of the entire sample and 18% of the low-caste group.  The infant   18 
mortality rate in the ST group is 10%, in contrast with 8.35% amongst high-caste 
Hindus.  Scheduled tribes are thought to  be the least integrated social group, 
historically having been isolated from community life, and tending to live in relative 
geographic isolation. This result is therefore quite striking.
14 
Some previous studies have found bigger impacts of state health expenditure 
on the poor (e.g.  Bidani and Ravallion 1997, Gupta et al. 2003). As discussed in 
section 2, we do not have household income data.
15 Given the difficulties with 
measuring income for poor households (a large fraction of which are self-employed), 
it is useful to look at heterogeneity by other, more stable, indicators of social class. 
Since rural and ST households are clearly relatively poor, there is some support in 
these data for the view that state health expenditure is, at the margin, more beneficial 
to the poor. However, uneducated  rural women are poor, and we find that health 
expenditure has no effect for this group. Father’s education may be a better indicator 
of the permanent income of the household. But we find no significant variation in the 
health expenditure effects by father’s education. Overall,  with the exception of 
scheduled tribes, it seems that the most poor (rural and uneducated) and the better off 
(urban) do not benefit as much as the group in the middle (rural but educated).    
The pattern of income effects is not the same as the pattern of  health 
expenditure effects (Table 5).  Indeed, in most cases, the differences are reversed. 
(Negative) income effects are larger for the more vulnerable groups. Recall that the 
effects of each of health expenditure and income are obtained conditional upon the 
other.  This contrast between their  distributional impact is consistent with 
complementarities between state health expenditure and personal attributes (education, 
information) that bias its effectiveness away from those individuals who need it most.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Infant mortality in rural India is significantly affected by  variation in state 
health expenditure, given state income, and the long run elasticity  is -0.24. We are 
unable to identify a corresponding effect amongst urban households. Failing to allow 
for h eterogeneity, lagged effects and state-specific trended unobservables results in 
                                                 
14 Scheduled tribes distinguish themselves from other social groups (including the SC) in 
having  lower infant mortality rates for girls as compared to  boys. This may be pertinent, 
although why exactly is unclear. 
15 Nor do the two studies cited here. They estimate the distribution of effects under sometimes 
strong assumptions – discussed in Gupta et al. 2003.   19 
under-estimation of the beneficial effects of health expenditure , and I have argued 
that this might explain some of the negative findings in the literature. The identified 
effect is  robust to controls for state-specific rainfall shocks and other state-level 
variables including education,  inequality and media prevalence.  Although it is 
encouraging that it works on average, health expenditure appears to bring no benefit 
to some  of the most vulnerable sections of society, a result that suggests 
complementarities between public and private (parental) inputs  in the survival 
technology . It is widely recognised that the composition of state health expenditure is 
non-progressive, and  that the share of p ublic health, water and family welfare 
programmes in rural areas needs to be raised (section 2). The results in this paper 
suggest that, at the same time, it is important to educate adults in the use and the 
benefits of simple health-promoting technologies. 
The effectiveness of health expenditure varies across the states, displaying a 
pattern that bears no evident relation to initial levels of mortality or income. A likely 
reason is that the states differ considerably in terms of initial  conditions including 
inequality and infrastructure (e.g. Datt and Ravallion 2002). In the panel data model, 
these are captured by the state fixed effects. States also differ in terms of their 
political economy (e.g.  Besley and Burgess 2002,  Arulampalam et al. 2007). The 
effectiveness of  public service delivery is  increasingly recognised as being no less 
important than raising the quantity of expenditure (e.g. Besley 2006, Public Affairs 
Center 2002, World Bank 2003). A recent initiative of the central government of India, 
the National Rural Health Mission aims to undertake “architectural correction” of the 
health system, promoting service delivery, for example, by increasing decentralisation 
to the village level and instituting a female health activist in each village (see NRHM 
2005). The NRHM also promises to raise the quantity of public health spending. The 
share of health expenditure in national income is only about 1% and it has decreased 
in the recent period of faster growth (see section 3). Under the NRHM it is expected 
to rise to  “2-3% of GDP” in 2005-2012.  The analysis in this paper needs to be 
repeated six years from now! 
    20 
References 
Anand, S. and M. Ravallion (1993), Human Development in Poor Countries: On the Role of 
Private incomes and Public Services, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1(3), pp 133-50. 
 
Arulampalam, W. and S. Bhalotra (2007), Sibling death clustering in India: State dependence 
vs unobserved heterogeneity. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 169(4): 829-
848. 
 
Arulampalam, W., S. Dasgupta, A. Dhillon and B. Dutta (2007), Electoral goals and center-
state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India, Mimeograph, 
University of Warwick.  
 
Basu, Alaka Malwade. 1989. Is Discrimination in Food Really Necessary for Explaining Sex 
Differentials in Childhood Mortality? Population Studies: A Journal of Demography 43, no. 2: 
193-210. 
 
Bertrand, M., E. Duflo and S. Mullainathan (2004), How Much Can We Trust Difference-in-
Difference Estimators?, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, pp. 249-275. 
 
Besley, T. (2006), Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Besley, T. and  R.  Burgess  (2004), Can labour regulation hinder economic 
performance? :Evidence from India, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 91-134. 
 
Bhalotra, S. (2007), Income volatility and infant death, Mimeograph, University of Bristol. 
 
Bhalotra, S. and A. van Soest (2007), Birth Spacing, Fertility & Neonatal Mortality in India: 
Dynamics, F railty & Fecundity, Working Paper 07/168, Centre for Market and Public 
Organisation, University of Bristol. 
 
Bidani, B. and M. Ravallion (1995), Decomposing social indicators using distributional data, 
Journal of Econometrics, Volume 77, Number 1, March 1997 , pp. 125-139 
 
Black, R., S. Morris and J. Bryce (2003), Where and Why Are 10 Million Children Dying 
Every Year? Lancet, 361, pp. 2226-34. 
 
Cameron, C. and P. Trivedi (2005),  Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cutler, D., A. Deaton and A. Lleras-Muney (2006), The determinants of mortality, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 20(3), Summer, 97-120. 
 
Cutler, D. and G. Miller (2005), The role of public health improvements in health advances: 
The twentieth century United States, Demography, 42(1), February, 1-22. 
 
Deaton, A. (2006a), The Great Escape: A review essay on Fogel’s The Escape from Hunger 
and Premature Death, 1700-2100, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 44(1), March: 106-114. 
 
Deaton, A. (2006b), Global patterns of income and health: Facts, interpretations and policies, 
WIDER Annual Lecture, September, Helsinki: WIDER  
   21 
Deaton, A. and C. Paxson (2004), Mortality, Income and Income Inequality Over Time in 
Britain and the US, in D. Wise (Ed), Perspectives in the Economics of Aging, University of 
Chicago Press: Chicago. 
 
Deolalikar, A. (2005), Attaining the Millennium Development Goals in India: How Likely and 
What Will It Take To Reduce  Infant Mortality, Child Malnutrition, Gender Disparities and 
Hunger-Poverty and to Increase School Enrollment and Completion? Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi, 2005. 
 
Durlauf, S, P. Johnson and J. Temple (2005), Growth Econometrics, chapter 8 in P. Aghion 
and S. N. Durlauf (Eds.)  Handbook of Economic Growth,  Volume 1A, North-Holland: 
Amsterdam, 2005, pp. 555-677. 
 
Filmer, D. and L. Pritchett (1999), The impact of public spending on health: does money 
matter?, Social Science and Medicine, 49(10), 1309-1323. 
 
Fogel, R. (2004),  The Escape from Hunger and Premature Death, 1700-2100- Europe, 
America and the Third World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gupta, S., M. Verhoeven and E. Tiongson (2002), Does higher government spending buy 
better results in education and health care?, European Journal of Political Economy,  18(4): 
717-37. 
 
Gupta, S., M. Verhoeven and E. Tiongson (2003), Public spending on health care and the 
poor, Health Economics, 12: 685-96. 
 
IIPS and ORC Macro (2000),  National Family Health Survey (NFHS-2) 1998-9: India. 
Mumbai: international institute For Population Sciences (IIPS). 
 
Jalan, J. and M. Ravallion (2003), Does piped water reduce diarrhoea for children in rural 
India, Journal of Econometrics, 112 (1), 153-173. 
 
Jones, G., R. Steketee, R. Black, Z. Bhutta, S. Morris and the Bellagio Child Survival Study 
Group  (2003) How many child deaths can we prevent this year? Lancet, 362, 19 July, 65-71. 
 
Koren, M. and S. Tenreyro (2007), Volatility and development,  Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, February, 243-287. 
 
Lane, Philip (2003), The Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the OECD, 
Journal of Public Economics, 87:2661-2675. 
  
Lanjouw, P. and M. Ravallion (1999), Benefit incidence, public spending reforms and the 
timing of program capture, World Bank Economic Review, 13(2), May: 257-273. 
 
NRHM (2005),  Mission documents of the National Rural Health Mission, Government of 
India, available at http://mohfw.nic.in/nrhm.html. 
 
Paxson, C. and N. Schady (2005),  Child heath and economic crisis in Peru,  World Bank 
Economic Review, 19(2), 203-223. 
 
Peters, D., A. Yazbeck, R. Sharma, G. Ramana, L. Pritchett, A. Wagstaff (2002),  Better 
Health Systems for India’s Poor, Human Development Network, Washington DC: The World 
Bank.   22 
Pritchett, L. (2000), Understanding patterns of economic growth: Searching for hills among 
plateaus, mountains and plains, The World Bank Economic Review, 14(2), 221-250. 
Pritchett, L. and L.H. Summers (1996), Wealthier Is Healthier. Journal of Human Resources, 
31(4), pp. 841-68. 
 
Public Affairs Centre (2002), Benchmarks for the new millennium: State of India’s public 
services, Public Affairs Centre, Bangalore, India. 
 
Temple, J. R. W. (1999). The new growth evidence, Journal of Economic Literature, March 
1999, 37(1), 112-156. 
 
The Tribune (2002), Reducing the infant mortality rate: A big challenge, Perspective feature 
on the Editorial Page, Sunday, 16 June, Chandigarh, India. 
 
Woo, J. (2005), The behaviour of fiscal policy: Cyclicality and discretionary fiscal decisions, 
Mimeograph, Kellstadt Graduate School of Business, DePaul University. 
 
World Bank (2003), World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor 
People, Washington DC: The World Bank.   23 
Table 1: Probit Estimates of Infant Mortality using Alternative Specifications of Health Expenditure 
Table 1A: Rural Sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Health expenditure  -0.015  0.007  0.000  0.014  0.031  0.105       
  [1.92]  [0.57]  [0.03]  [0.66]  [1.22]  [1.28]       
Square of health expenditure        -0.006  -0.005  -0.018       
        [1.87]  [1.26]  [1.27]       
First lag of health expenditure              -0.012  0.015  0.008 
              [1.63]  [1.58]  [0.91] 
                   
Income  -0.051  -0.028  -0.037  -0.046  -0.023  -0.045  -0.055  -0.026  -0.038 
  [6.00]  [1.26]  [2.73]  [6.08]  [1.14]  [3.82]  [6.70]  [1.28]  [2.91] 
State dummies  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Year dummies  ˛  ￿  ￿  ˛  ￿  ￿  ˛  ￿  ￿ 
State-specific trends  ˛  ˛  ￿  ˛  ˛  ￿  ˛  ˛  ￿ 
Table 1B: Urban Sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Health expenditure  -0.002  0.013  0.003  -0.022  -0.008  -0.055       
  [0.22]  [0.88]  [0.18]  [0.48]  [0.12]  [0.86]       
Square of health expenditure        0.004  0.004  0.010       
        [0.47]  [0.36]  [0.90]       
First lag of health expenditure              -0.008  0.019  0.011 
              [1.07]  [1.69]  [0.85] 
                   
Income  -0.042  -0.023  -0.032  -0.044  -0.026  -0.030  -0.034  -0.023  -0.033 
  [3.70]  [1.24]  [1.29]  [3.64]  [1.36]  [1.16]  [2.94]  [1.19]  [1.30] 
State dummies  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Year dummies  ˛  ￿  ￿  ˛  ￿  ￿  ˛  ￿  ￿ 
State-specific trends  ˛  ˛  ￿  ˛  ˛  ￿  ˛  ˛  ￿ 
Notes: The number of observations (number of live births) is 117088 in the rural sample and 35783 in the urban sample. These are marginal effects from a probit; significant 
coefficients are in bold. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. State health expenditure and state income are real 
per capita measures cast in logarithms. Every equation includes state-specific positive and negative rainfall shocks and micro-demographic controls (dummies for child 
gender and birth-month, age of mother at birth of the child, level of education of each of mother and father, and ethnicity and religion of the household).    24 
Table 2: Probit Estimates of Infant Mortality: Distributed Lag Model 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Baseline  Add rain-shocks  Add state-controls  
L(ln health expenditure)  0.012  0.008  0.006 
  [1.38]  [0.96]  [0.75] 
L2(ln health expenditure)  0.003  0.002  -0.005 
  [0.23]  [0.16]  [0.44] 
L3(ln health expenditure)  -0.022  -0.020  -0.020 
  [2.39]  [1.94]  [1.84] 
L4(ln health expenditure)  -0.007  -0.005  -0.008 
  [0.71]  [0.45]  [0.64] 
Long run marginal effect  -0.014  -0.015  -0.027 
  [0.96]  [0.98]  [1.73] 
Health expenditure elasticity  -0.148  -0.158  -0.285 
       
L(ln ncome)  -0.018  -0.019  -0.027 
  [1.10]  [1.24]  [1.62] 
L2(ln income)  -0.006  -0.005  -0.007 
  [0.47]  [0.44]  [0.56] 
L3(ln ncome)  -0.056  -0.056  -0.052 
  [4.14]  [4.73]  [5.52] 
L4(ln income)  0.031  0.034  0.031 
  [3.00]  [3.92]  [3.73] 
Long run marginal effect  -0.048  -0.047  -0.054 
  [2.07]  [2.06]  [2.55] 
Income elasticity  -0.506  -0.496  -0.570 
Notes: Rural sample, N=117088. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. L denotes lag. Every equation includes 
state and year dummies, state-specific trends and the micro-demographic controls listed in Notes to Table 1. Column 2 further includes positive and negative state-specific 
rainfall shocks. The additional controls in Column 3 are the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural output in the state, inflation of consumer prices for agricultural and 
industrial workers, the log poverty headcount ratio and the log of the Gini coefficient for each of the rural and urban sectors, and a quadratic in per capita newspaper 
circulation.   25 
Table 3: Probit Estimates of Infant Mortality : Parsimonious Model With 
Significant Lags 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  No state-trends  Include state-trends 
    Add state-X    Add state-X 
L3(ln health expenditure)  -0.009  -0.016  -0.020  -0.023 
  [0.67]  [1.46]  [2.17]  [2.86] 
Health expenditure elasticity  -0.095  -0.169  -0.211  -0.243 
L3(ln ncome)  -0.059  -0.058  -0.059  -0.057 
  [2.89]  [3.66]  [4.31]  [5.30] 
L4(ln income)  0.039  0.034  0.032  0.031 
  [3.45]  [3.16]  [3.28]  [2.93] 
Long run marginal effect  -0.020  -0.023  -0.027  -0.026 
  [0.83]  [1.38]  [2.47]  [2.64] 
Income elasticity  -0.212  -0.247  -0.283  -0.277 
Notes: Rural sample, N=117088. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Absolute t-
statistics are in parentheses. L denotes lag. Full results, showing the marginal effects of all covariates, 
are in Table A5 of the Online Appendix referred to in footnote 5. Every equation includes state and 
year fixed effects, rainshocks and micro-demographic controls. Columns 2 and 4 also include state-
level controls; see Notes to Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Table 4: Panel Data Estimates for the Infant Mortality Rate  
  (1)  (2) 
  4 lags  Significant lags 
L(ln health expenditure)  0.005   
  [0.51]   
L2(ln health expenditure)  -0.014   
  [0.87]   
L3(ln health expenditure)  -0.022  -0.029 
  [1.90]  [2.97] 
L4(ln health expenditure)  -0.009   
  [0.92]   
Long run marginal effect  -0.040  -0.029 
  [1.86]  [2.97] 
Health expenditure elasticity  -0.425  -0.306 
L(ln ncome)  -0.017   
  [0.83]   
L2(ln income)  0.007   
  [0.44]   
L3(ln ncome)  -0.054  -0.055 
  [4.71]  [4.14] 
L4(ln income)  0.028  0.028 
  [2.07]  [2.06] 
Long run marginal effect  -0.037  -0.027 
  [1.55]  [1.50] 
Income elasticity  -0.392  -0.282 
Notes: These are within-group estimates on the state panel (see section 5.2). Columns 1 and 2 
correspond to Table 2 (col.3) and Table 3 (col.4). These equations include state and year fixed effects,   26 
state-specific trends, rainshocks, micro-demographic and state-level controls. Standard errors are robust 
and clustered at the state level. Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.   27 
Table 5A 
Heterogeneity in the Health Expenditure Effect by Population Sub-Group 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
  Sector  Gender  Caste  Religion 
  Rural   Urban  Boys  Girls  High caste  Low caste  ST  Hindu  Not Hindu  Muslim 
L3(health expenditure)  -0.020  -0.010  -0.026  -0.016  -0.020  -0.016  -0.089  -0.019  -0.024  -0.044 
  [2.17]  [1.06]  [2.20]  [1.14]  [1.87]  [1.16]  [3.12]  [1.75]  [1.45]  [2.33] 
elasticity  -0.211  -0.108  -0.271  -0.168  -0.196  -0.158  -0.817  -0.189  -0.434  -0.694 
                     
Income  -0.027  0.051  -0.025  -0.032  -0.019  -0.027  0.035  -0.031  -0.013  -0.043 
  [2.47]  [2.59]  [1.89]  [2.36]  [0.97]  [2.05]  [0.90]  [2.14]  [0.27]  [0.80] 
elasticity  -0.283  0.537  -0.257  -0.342  -0.193  -0.315  0.375  -0.311  -0.173  -0.548 
Mean of dep var  0.093  0.059  0.0939  0.0958  0.0835  0.0997  0.100  0.0987  0.0735  0.079 
N  117088  35783  61002  56086  38360  77225  13820  98884  18204  13136 
% of group  69  31  52.1  47.9  33.2  66.8  12.0  84.4  15.6  11.2 
 
See Notes to Table 5B   28 
Table 5B 
Heterogeneity in the Health Expenditure Effect by Population Sub-Group (contd). 
  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)  (21) 
  Birth order  Mother’s education  Father’s education  Maternal age at birth 
  First born  Other  None  Some  Higher  None  Some  Higher  9-18  19-30  31-49 
L3(health expenditure)  -0.009  -0.023  -0.014  -0.035  -0.001  -0.009  -0.009  -0.019  -0.006  -0.028  0.011 
  [0.31]  [2.75]  [1.54]  [2.41]  [2.65]  [0.31]  [0.31]  [1.38]  [0.26]  [3.02]  [0.68] 
Elasticity  -0.091  -0.245  -0.138  -0.738  -4.858  -0.091  -0.091  -0.402  -0.047  -0.403  0.160 
                       
Income  -0.034  -0.028  -0.031  -0.024  0.065  -0.018  -0.034  -0.020  0.000  -0.045  -0.078 
  [1.57]  [1.94]  [2.37]  [1.24]  [0.46]  [0.72]  [2.10]  [0.48]  [0.01]  [3.92]  [1.09] 
Elasticity  -0.353  -0.302  -0.299  -0.358  1.889  -0.173  -0.392  -0.284  -0.003  -0.511  -0.859 
Mean of dep var  0.0968  0.0942  0.1042  0.0685  0.0346  0.0968  0.0968  0.0709  0.1223  0.0878  0.0904 
N  26737  90351  86305  30783  4017  26737  26737  20505  22993  83818  10277 
% of group  22.8  77.2  73.7  26.3  3.5  22.8  22.8  17.5  19.6  71.6  8.8 
 
Notes: The specification estimated is that in column 3 of Table 3. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Absolute t-statistics are in 
parentheses. L3 denotes the third lag of log health expenditure p.c. The reported marginal effect for income is the long run effect derived from its third and 
fourth lag. Elasticities are calculated at the mean for the sub-group; these means are shown in the Table. Controls include state and year effects and state-
specific trends, micro-demographics and rainfall shocks. Except in the case of column 2, the sample is restricted to rural households. The last row shows the 
sample percentage of each sub-group. The category “Not Hindu” includes Muslim, but I further show results for Muslims alone. Higher education is defined 
as completion of secondary or higher. The samples are created separately for mother’s and father’s education. In the sample of children whose fathers have no 
education, 93% of mothers have no education. However, in the sample whose mothers have no education, only 51% of fathers have no education. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Average Annual Linear Rate Of Growth Of Main Variables in  
1970-98. All Figures Are In Percentages 
 







Andhra  -2.86  5.45  1.70  3.75 
Assam   -1.67  5.30  2.78  2.52 
Bihar   -2.26  5.11  3.48  1.63 
Gujarat   -2.87  4.00  0.46  3.54 
Haryana  -1.04  4.09  1.09  3.00 
Karnataka  -3.17  4.82  1.61  3.21 
Kerala  -9.79  4.05  1.09  2.96 
Madhya  -2.75  4.93  1.89  3.04 
Maharashtra   -3.53  4.07  -0.26  4.33 
Orissa  -2.79  4.82  1.73  3.10 
Punjab   0.17  4.02  1.20  2.81 
Rajasthan  -2.42  4.49  2.27  2.23 
Tamil Nadu  -4.10  5.35  1.19  4.17 
Uttar Pradesh  -4.11  4.77  2.86  1.91 
West Bengal   -5.29  3.56  0.92  2.63 
India   -3.23  4.59  1.60  2.99 
s.d.   2.24  0.59  0.97  0.76 
 
Notes: Growth rates are obtained by regression of the logarithm of the variable on a linear 
trend using the state panel with 29 years, 1970-98. The standard deviation of growth rates 
across states is denoted s.d. in the last row. Health expenditure and income are deflated and 
per capita. Health share is share of state health expenditure in state income. Most growth rates 
are significant at the 1% l evel. The exceptions are as follows. Infant mortality decline is 
insignificant in Punjab and Haryana. Growth in health share is insignificant in Gujarat and 
Maharashtra.    33 
Table A2: Summary Statistics of Variables in the Analysis 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
log p.c. real health expenditure  2.85  0.45  0.66  3.79 
log share of health expenditure in state income  -4.21  0.28  -6.14  -3.63 
log p.c real net state domestic product  7.06  0.37  5.97  8.17 
infant mortality  0.094  0.292  0  1 
Child gender         
Male  0.521       
Female  0.479       
Child birth-month         
January  0.068       
February  0.065       
March  0.082       
April  0.079       
May  0.078       
June  0.085       
July  0.087       
August  0.106       
September  0.091       
October  0.095       
November  0.088       
December  0.076       
Mother's age at birth of index child         
9-15  0.036       
16-18  0.158       
19-24  0.468       
25-30  0.249       
31-49  0.090       
Mother's education         
None  0.733       
Incomplete primary  0.086       
Primary  0.060       
Incompete secondary  0.084       
Secondary or higher  0.037       
Father's education         
None  0.399       
Incomplete primary  0.122       
Primary  0.099       
Incompete secondary  0.202       
Secondary  0.093       
higher than secondary  0.085       
Ethnicity         
Higher castes  0.331       
Scheduled caste  0.207       
Scheduled tribe  0.121       
Other backward caste  0.341       
Ethnicity missing  0.013       
Religion         
Hindu  0.844       
Muslim  0.113       
Christian  0.013       
Other religion  0.006       
Notes: Income and health expenditure in the first three rows are available at the state level. All other 
statistics presented here are for the rural sample; statistics for the urban sample are available on request. 
Standard deviations are not provided for indicator variables. For indicators, the minimum and 
maximum values are 0 and 1, so these are not shown. The category that is excluded from the regression 
is italicised.    34 
Table A3: State-Specific Estimates Using Current Health Expenditure 
  Panel A: Include Trend  Panel B: No Trend  N 
             
  health 
exp 
Income  trend  health 
exp 
income   
Andhra Pradesh  -0.032  -0.030  0.001  -0.025  -0.017  6025 
  [1.2]  [0.59]  [0.31]  [1.53]  [0.62]   
Assam  -0.028  -0.019  0.002  -0.017  0.017  6246 
  [1.63]  [0.36]  [1.88]  [1.04]  [0.35]   
Bihar  0.017  -0.072  -0.001  -0.002  -0.065  15978 
  [1.23]  [2.45]  [1.65]  [0.3]  [2.23]   
Gujarat  0.002  -0.013  -0.002  -0.016  -0.037  5296 
  [0.07]  [0.31]  [0.9]  [0.79]  [1.22]   
Haryana  -0.004  -0.023  -0.001  -0.007  -0.039  4969 
  [0.18]  [0.3]  [0.23]  [0.38]  [1.19]   
Karnataka  -0.030  0.096  -0.004  -0.054  0.037  6338 
  [1.06]  [1.45]  [1.29]  [2.34]  [0.84]   
Kerala  0.004  0.022  -0.002  -0.017  -0.013  2920 
  [0.16]  [0.51]  [1.3]  [0.74]  [0.41]   
Madhya  -0.001  -0.058  -0.002  -0.009  -0.091  13445 
  [0.08]  [1.26]  [0.94]  [0.62]  [3.04]   
Maharashtra  -0.062  -0.047  0.003  -0.052  -0.002  4660 
  [2.82]  [0.81]  [0.83]  [2.86]  [0.1]   
Orissa  -0.010  -0.009  -0.002  -0.031  -0.026  7679 
  [0.33]  [0.2]  [1.14]  [1.38]  [0.66]   
Punjab  -0.030  -0.011  0.001  -0.026  0.001  3939 
  [0.88]  [0.14]  [0.2]  [0.97]  [0.03]   
Rajasthan  0.000  -0.055  -0.001  -0.016  -0.057  13685 
  [0.01]  [1.96]  [0.51]  [1.28]  [2.04]   
Tamil Nadu  -0.025  0.043  -0.004  -0.051  -0.006  4679 
  [0.81]  [0.81]  [1.32]  [1.95]  [0.18]   
Uttar Pradesh  -0.028  0.077  -0.005  -0.067  -0.010  20975 
  [1.5]  [1.24]  [4.85]  [3.81]  [0.17]   
West Bengal  -0.113  0.007  0.001  -0.101  0.032  5132 
  [2.93]  [0.11]  [0.63]  [3.19]  [0.59]   
India  0.004  -0.032    0.002  -0.011  195365 
  [0.47]  [2.46]    [0.21]  [0.42]   
 
Notes: Absolute robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant coefficients are in bold. Panel A 
shows results from a model that also includes a trend, the analogue of the model that includes 
state-specific trends when the data are pooled, as in Tables 1-4. The trend is not significant in most 
states. Panel B shows results obtained after dropping the trend. To obtain the all-India coefficients, 
I condition upon state dummies and time dummies and, in parallel with the state-specific results, 
include state-specific trends in Panel A but not in Panel B. There are no other control variables (X) 
in these models. 
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Table A4: Alternative Estimators & Standard Error Adjustments 
 
  No state-specific trends  Add state-specific trends   
  none   robust  cluster  none   robust  cluster  LPM 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Health 
expenditure 
0.009  0.009  0.009  0.002  0.002  0.002  -0.000 
  [1.16]  [1.16]  [0.80]  [0.19]  [0.20]  [0.14]  [0.03] 
Income  -0.021  -0.021  -0.021  -0.029  -0.029  -0.029  -0.027 
  [2.22]  [2.22]  [0.88]  [2.17]  [2.17]  [2.09]  [2.26] 
 
Notes: This is the model in Table 1 with current log health expenditure and log income as key regressors. It is run for rural households, N=117088. Absolute 
t-statistics are in parentheses. Every column contains state and year dummies. Columns 1-3 and 4-6 show that clustering the standard errors by state raises 
them substantially if state trends are excluded. Column 7 shows the specification in column 6 estimated by the Linear Probability Model rather than the probit. 
The coefficients on income and health expenditure in the LPM are a bit smaller than but not significantly different from the corresponding probit marginal 
effects. 
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Table A5: Parsimonious Model With Significant Lags 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  No state-trends  Include state-trends 
    Add state-X    Add state-X 
L3(ln health expenditure)  -0.009  -0.016  -0.020*  -0.023** 
  [0.67]  [1.46]  [2.17]  [2.86] 
Health expenditure elasticity  -0.095  -0.169  -0.211  -0.243 
         
L3(ln ncome)  -0.059**  -0.058**  -0.059**  -0.057** 
  [2.89]  [3.66]  [4.31]  [5.30] 
L4(ln income)  0.039**  0.034**  0.032**  0.031** 
  [3.45]  [3.16]  [3.28]  [2.93] 
Long run marginal effect  -0.020  -0.023  -0.027  -0.026 
  [0.83]  [1.38]  [2.47]  [2.64] 
Income elasticity  -0.212  -0.247  -0.283  -0.277 
         
ln (state population)  -0.006  0.045  -0.051  0.003 
  [0.14]  [0.69]  [0.21]  [0.02] 
1 if female  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  [0.81]  [0.79]  [0.82]  [0.80] 
Child birth month (base=January)         
February  -0.006  -0.007  -0.006  -0.007 
  [1.31]  [1.50]  [1.30]  [1.50] 
March  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007 
  [1.56]  [1.51]  [1.59]  [1.54] 
April  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  [0.16]  [0.16]  [0.16]  [0.17]   37 
May  -0.005  -0.004  -0.005  -0.005 
  [0.77]  [0.74]  [0.79]  [0.77] 
June  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  [0.21]  [0.26]  [0.20]  [0.23] 
July  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  [0.17]  [0.23]  [0.16]  [0.21] 
August  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.005 
  [1.17]  [1.17]  [1.16]  [1.15] 
September  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  [0.23]  [0.20]  [0.23]  [0.20] 
October  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 
  [0.83]  [0.80]  [0.83]  [0.80] 
November  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008 
  [1.47]  [1.42]  [1.46]  [1.43] 
December  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 
  [0.59]  [0.57]  [0.60]  [0.58] 
Birth order of child (base=1)         
2  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
  [1.37]  [1.37]  [1.40]  [1.38] 
3  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  [0.16]  [0.10]  [0.07]  [0.06] 
4  0.011**  0.011**  0.010**  0.011** 
  [4.45]  [4.47]  [4.42]  [4.48] 
5 or more  0.016**  0.016**  0.016**  0.016** 
  [8.59]  [8.57]  [8.48]  [8.49] 
Maternal education (base=none)         
Incomplete primary  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008   38 
  [1.86]  [1.84]  [1.81]  [1.81] 
Complete primary  -0.011**  -0.011**  -0.010**  -0.011** 
  [2.86]  [2.91]  [2.80]  [2.84] 
Incomplete secondary  -0.015**  -0.016**  -0.015**  -0.016** 
  [3.81]  [3.94]  [3.90]  [4.00] 
Secondary or higher  -0.035**  -0.035**  -0.036**  -0.036** 
  [5.00]  [5.12]  [5.15]  [5.21] 
Paternal education (base=none)         
Incomplete primary  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
  [0.60]  [0.58]  [0.58]  [0.56] 
Complete primary  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
  [1.03]  [1.09]  [1.04]  [1.08] 
Incomplete secondary  -0.013**  -0.013**  -0.013**  -0.013** 
  [5.72]  [5.81]  [5.79]  [5.78] 
Complete secondary  -0.023**  -0.022**  -0.022**  -0.022** 
  [7.07]  [6.95]  [7.08]  [7.01] 
Post-secondary  -0.019**  -0.019**  -0.019**  -0.018** 
  [4.25]  [4.21]  [4.30]  [4.23] 
Caste (base=upper caste)         
Scheduled caste  0.010**  0.010**  0.010**  0.010** 
  [3.37]  [3.41]  [3.36]  [3.36] 
Scheduled tribe  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003 
  [0.58]  [0.65]  [0.58]  [0.64] 
Other backward caste  0.006  0.006  0.006  0.006 
  [1.91]  [1.88]  [1.92]  [1.87] 
Religion (base=Hindu)         
Muslim  -0.007  -0.007*  -0.007  -0.007   39 
  [1.88]  [1.96]  [1.92]  [1.96] 
Christian  -0.007  -0.008  -0.006  -0.007 
  [0.70]  [0.81]  [0.67]  [0.76] 
Other religion  -0.019**  -0.018**  -0.018**  -0.018** 
  [2.95]  [2.93]  [2.96]  [2.95] 
Maternal age at birth          
(base=19-24 years)         
9-15 years  0.053**  0.053**  0.052**  0.052** 
  [10.26]  [10.34]  [10.24]  [10.26] 
16-18 years  0.024**  0.024**  0.024**  0.024** 
  [10.51]  [10.89]  [10.47]  [10.69] 
25-30 years  -0.013**  -0.013**  -0.013**  -0.013** 
  [8.32]  [8.53]  [8.25]  [8.67] 
31-49 years  -0.010**  -0.009**  -0.010**  -0.010** 
  [5.87]  [5.66]  [5.64]  [5.63] 
         
State-level variables         
ln ratio of agri to nonagri product    -0.002    0.004 
    [0.19]    [0.39] 
inflation in prices in agri    -0.037    -0.031 
    [1.81]    [1.50] 
inflation in prices for industrial workers  0.178**    0.168** 
    [2.83]    [2.65] 
log rural poverty headcount rate    0.006    -0.007 
    [0.43]    [0.81] 
log urban poverty headcount rate    -0.017*    -0.001 
    [2.29]    [0.12]   40 
ln Gini in rural areas    -0.013    0.007 
    [0.91]    [0.64] 
ln Gini in urban areas    0.013**    0.012** 
    [3.94]    [3.72] 
ln newspaper circulation    -0.081**    -0.052* 
    [2.72]    [2.36] 
square of log newsp circulation    -0.011**    -0.006 
    [2.78]    [1.69] 
Notes: The key results from this Table are in Table 3 of the paper. Here I show the coefficients on all of the other covariates. This is the rural sample with 
N=117088. L denotes lag. Every equation also includes state and year fixed effects and positive and negative state-specific rainfall shocks (not displayed). 
   41 
Figure A1 
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